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Summary 
This paper studies how robust or sensitive Steiner’s peak load pricing results are to changes 
in certain assumptions. The peak-load problem deals with choosing the optimal pricing 
scheme leading to optimal output when there is a non-storable good whose demand fluctuates 
periodically at a uniform price. In the long-run planning point of view the problem also deals 
with optimal capacity of the system as opposed to short-run where the existing capacity is 
fixed an thus not subject to determination. I consider the peak-load problem for electric 
utilities.  
 
Steiner’s Peak load pricing results involves charging different prices for electricity in 
different time intervals aiming to mitigate the inefficiency of underutilized capacity over the 
cycle. The prices advocated by Steiner are set in accordance with long-run marginal costs and 
peak users bear all of the capacity cost. Relatively high price in the peak-demand period 
reduces the peak-demand and thus also the need for capacity investments for meeting peak 
demands. Comparatively, low price in the off-peak period is charged encouraging demand 
thereby making better use of existing capacity. Optimal capacity for the long-run planning 
point of view is simply found where capacity is equal to the peak load. However, this is 
strictly speaking not a result of the Steiner model – it is a relationship by definition. 
 
I consider those papers relaxing one of the assumptions of the Steiner model without 
seriously undermining the insights from the basic model. I will study the implication of 
relaxing the assumptions: long-run planning point of view, linear costs, capacity fully 
variable in the long-run, independent demand, a welfare-maximizing social planner, single-
technology and periods of equal lengths. I disregard those articles deriving a completely new 
model where the results are not directly comparable with the results of the Steiner model. I 
will not study the implication of changing the framework of a static, deterministic partial 
equilibrium model with exogenously determined demand functions, homogenous agents, no 
transmission costs, no intra period time varying demand, no storage possibilities, fully 
divisible capacity and no competitive element.  
 
The result of price equal to long run marginal cost is not robust to changes in the assumption 
of long run planning point of view, linear costs, and fully variable capacity in the long run, 
dependent demand and the objective of maximizing welfare. When relaxing the assumptions, 
!! V!
prices still depend on marginal cost, however not the long-run marginal cost Steiner advocate 
but the short-run marginal cost. When considering a breakeven welfare-maximizing social 
planner or a profit-maximizing social planner, prices also depend on elasticity of demand. A 
breakeven constraint is imposed when there are non-linear costs or fixed capacity in the long 
run, to ensure the firm at least breaks even. If the monopoly is regulated the prices are also 
affected by the specific regulation. When dependent demand is considered, prices also 
depend on the cross-elasticity of demand. However, the relevance for this thesis of altering 
the assumption of independent demands is questionable. Dependent demand may violate the 
framework of partial equilibrium model and thus be outside the scope of this paper. With 
multiple technologies some sort of marginal cost pricing is still relevant. Price is set equal to 
the marginal cost of expanding the demand in that period.  
 
Result of peak price higher than off-peak price follows automatically in the standard model in 
which there is a welfare objective, the firm has constant returns to scale in production and 
where capacity is fully variable in the long-run view. In general, nothing as strong as result 2 
can be stated when considering a profit-maximizing monopoly or a breakeven welfare-
maximizing social planner. Then prices depend on elasticity of demand and the pricing 
reversal phenomenon may occur depending on the parameters. Additionally, when we relax 
the assumption of independent demand, price will also depend on the cross-elasticity of 
demand and may contribute to pricing reversal. 
 
Result of no responsibility for capacity cost imputed to those customers whose demand does 
not press upon capacity has been criticized on welfare grounds. Off-peak customers are also 
served by the capacity even if they do not press against the capacity limit. In the single-
technology case the result is not valid for the short-run peak load problem, as capacity cost is 
only related to the long-run peak load problem. The one-technology (i.e. homogenous plant 
capacity) assumption is crucial for the result that peak users bear all of the capacity costs. 
When diverse technology is introduced off-peak customers are made to contribute to capacity 
costs, since they press against the capacity limit to the base-load capacity.  
 
Result of optimal capacity found where it is equal to peak demand when optimized is 
relatively simple, and therefore does survive the different extensions reviewed. For all the 
extensions of the model, optimal capacity is equal to peak load demand due to the imputed 
capacity constraint. However, how to find optimal capacity in the extended models is 
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different than Steiner advocate. Optimal capacity is found where the willingness to pay for an 
additional unit of capacity is equal to the cost of that unit including other components specific 
for the relaxed assumptions.  
 
The robust result of Steiner’s peak-load pricing when relaxing the above-mentioned 
assumptions is to set one price in each pricing period in accordance with the pattern of 
demand and prices are closely tied to variation in the marginal cost of generating electricity. 
Optimal capacity is equal to peak load.  
 
 
!! VII!
Preface 
 
When attending the course Environmental Economics (ECON4910), spring 2012, I came 
across a survey of the peak-load pricing literature by Michael A. Crew, Chitru S. Fernando 
and Paul K. Kleindorfer (1995). I was immediately fascinated by the theoretical development 
of peak-load pricing. Especially the numerous citations of an old paper written by Peter O. 
Steiner (1957) with the title: “Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing” raised my attention. It 
appeared to me that the development of the peak-load pricing literature until 1995 consisted 
of relaxing the assumptions of this simple Steiner Model. I was highly inspired and saw the 
chance of combining my interest for electricity economics, mathematics and history.  
 
I deeply thank my supervisor Finn R. Førsund for his patient guidance, inspiration and 
insightful comments, and for sharing the fascination of the topic. I would also thank Nils C. 
Framstad for valuable explanation of line-integrals and uncertainty. A special thanks goes to 
Erika. Her constructive feedbacks have helped me organize my ideas properly.   
 
At last, I would thank family and friends for their love and support in a time of both academic 
and personal challenges.  
 
Any mistakes are mine alone.  
 
 
 
Ragnhild Døble 
Stavanger, May 2014 
 
!!VIII!
  
!! IX!
Table of Contents 
!
1! Introduction+..............................................................................................................................+1!
2! The+Peak+Load+Problem+........................................................................................................+4!
3! Steiner’s+model+and+assumptions+......................................................................................+9!
3.1! The+Steiner+Model+.........................................................................................................................+9!3.1.1! The!Firm!Peak!case!...............................................................................................................................!11!3.1.2! The!Shifting!Peak!case!.........................................................................................................................!12!
3.2! Mathematical+background+.......................................................................................................+13!
3.3! Comments+......................................................................................................................................+15!
3.4! The+Steiner+peakCload+pricing+result+....................................................................................+17!
4! How+later+economists+have+developed+the+Steiner+Model+......................................+19!
4.1! The+shortCrun+solution+and+capacity+constraint+...............................................................+19!4.1.1! Mathematical!formulation!.................................................................................................................!19!4.1.2! Graphical!representation!...................................................................................................................!22!4.1.3! Implication!for!the!Steiner!result!...................................................................................................!24!
4.2! The+problem+of+deficits+–+The+breakeven+welfareCmaximization+model+.................+25!4.2.1! Capacity!fixed!in!the!longFrun!..........................................................................................................!25!4.2.2! NonFlinear!costs!.....................................................................................................................................!28!4.2.3! Implication!for!the!Steiner!result!...................................................................................................!32!
4.3! Dependent+demand+....................................................................................................................+33!4.3.1! The!model!.................................................................................................................................................!35!4.3.2! Implication!for!the!Steiner!result!...................................................................................................!37!
4.4! The+profitCmaximizing+monopoly+..........................................................................................+37!4.4.1! The!unregulated!profitFmaximizing!monopoly!........................................................................!38!4.4.2! The!regulated!profitFmaximizing!monopoly!..............................................................................!39!4.4.3! Implication!for!the!Steiner!results!.................................................................................................!42!
4.5! Multiple+Technologies+...............................................................................................................+43!4.5.1! Optimal!technology!mix!......................................................................................................................!44!4.5.2! Optimal!pricing!.......................................................................................................................................!45!4.5.3! Implication!for!the!Steiner!result!...................................................................................................!47!
4.6! Unequal+length+of+periods+........................................................................................................+48!
5! Findings+....................................................................................................................................+49!
6! References+...............................................................................................................................+52!
Appendices+.....................................................................................................................................+57!
A++++Social+Science+Citation+Index+–+results+......................................................................................+57!
B++++Mathematical+calculations+............................................................................................................+58!
 
 
!!X!
Figures and tables 
 
+
Figure 1: The load curve (left hand) and load duration curve (right hand)+........................................................+6!
Figure 2: The load curve and load duration curve when storage is possible+......................................................+7!
Figure 3: Uniform pricing+............................................................................................................................................+10!
Figure 4: Optimal solution to the firm peak case+....................................................................................................+11!
Figure 5: The load curve and load duration curve for the Steiner model+.........................................................+15!
Figure 6: The short and long run solution+................................................................................................................+22!
Figure 7: Efficient frontier. Source: Crew and Kleindorfer (1975, p. 84)+.............................................................+44!
+
+
Table 1: Overview over functions for total costs+.....................................................................................................+28!
Table 2: Particular forms for the profit ceiling+.......................................................................................................+42!!!
!! XI!
List of common variables ! Number of periods in a cycle, 1,2… !…! ℎ Number of technology types, 1,2… !… ℎ ! Profit function  !" Total cost function ! Consumer’s surplus 
 !! Quantity of output supplied in period ! !!" Quantity of output supplied in period ! from technology/plant ! !!(!!) Inverse demand function for output in period !  !! ! Market price for quantity !! in period!! ! Capacity of the system subject to determination (endogenous variable) ! Capacity of the system not subject to determination (exogenous variable) !! Capacity of technology ! ! Operating costs per unit per period (marginal operating costs) !! Operating costs per unit supplied by technology ! per period. ! The cost of providing a unit of capacity (marginal capacity cost) !! The cost of providing a unit of capacity of technology ! 
 !! Shadow price on capacity constraint in period ! !!" ! Shadow price on capacity constraint for technology ! in period ! ! Shadow price on breakeven requirement  !! Shadow price on regulatory constraint 
 !! Ramsey number, ! = !!!! !! ! Price elasticity, !! = − !!!! !!!!!! !!" ! Cross-price elasticity, !!" = − !!!! !!!!!! , ! ≠ ! 
!0!
 
 
 
 
 
! 1!
1 Introduction 
 
The peak-load problem is about finding the optimal pricing scheme leading to optimal output, 
and future optimal capacity when there is a non-storable good whose demand varies 
periodically. Real world pricing problems for electric utility (and telecommunications) 
motivated the early work on the peak load pricing theory. While peak-load problem was 
originally seen in connection to electric power and monopolies, its use have now spread to 
competitive industries such as hotels and airlines, and other public enterprises as postal 
services. 
 
Steiner’s paper Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing (1957) provided the basis for the peak-load 
pricing theory and is more cited than contemporary and subsequent peak-load pricing article 
(see appendix A). The peak-load pricing theory has progressively investigated the effects of 
relaxing the assumptions of the Steiner model to introduce a more complex and realistic 
framework. This paper study the assumptions of the Steiner model and discusses the 
implications of removing them. Beyond a short overview given in some papers as part of an 
introduction e.g. Abrate (2004), my research has not uncovered any paper consistently 
surveying how subsequent economist has developed the Steiner model.  
 
This paper seeks to answer how robust or sensitive Steiner’s peak load pricing results are to 
changes in certain assumptions, where robust is defined as the ability of an economic model 
to remain valid under different assumptions. Additionally, this paper examines if the results 
flow from a special crucial assumptions. Crucial assumption defined as, see Solow (1956, p. 
65), one on which the conclusions do not depend sensitively. 
 
As I am aiming for a unified framework I will limit the peak-load problem to the electric 
utilities, which was the original application of the peak-load literature. Due to their emphasis 
on precisely such a framework, I will focus on the peak-load problem literature from 
Steiner’s article in 1957 to the survey of Crew, Fernando and Kleindorfer in 1995. The 
competitive element with the deregulation of the 1990s would change the model framework 
of the Steiner model and is not considered.  
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This paper considers those papers relaxing one of the assumptions of the Steiner model 
without seriously undermining the insights from the basic model. I disregard those articles 
deriving a completely new model where the results are not directly comparable with the 
results of the Steiner model.  
 
I have only considered those models that are simple, which is related to Steiner’s aim (1957, 
p. 604): to show the nature of the optimal solution to the peak load pricing problem “under 
some very restrictive assumption”, which suggests he did not attempted to develop a model 
that could best mimic or approximate the reality. More likely he developed a model whose 
aim was to depict some ideal situation which could be used as a benchmark, or in the 
terminology of Gibbard and Varian (1978, p. 665), to derive a “caricature” who seek to “give 
an impression of some aspects of economic reality not by describing it directly, but rather by 
emphasizing – even to the point of distorting – certain selected aspect of the economic 
situations”.    
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the peak load problem 
for the electricity sector. It will be explained why non-storability and periodic demand 
fluctuations give rise to the peak-load problem. Uncertainty and dynamics complicate the 
peak-load problem, however they will only be briefly explained. Because these features are 
not essential for the existence of the (theoretical) peak-load problem and studying them 
further is outside the scope of simple models. Section 3 describes the Steiner model and sets 
out the Steiner results. Section 4 reviews models where the following assumptions are 
altered:  
1. The long-run planning point of view 
2. Linear costs and capacity fully variable in the long-run 
3. Independent demand 
4. A welfare-maximizing social planner 
5. Only one type of technology 
6. Periods of equal length 
I will only study their isolated effects.  
 
The following assumptions – the fundament of the Steiner model – are unchanged: a static, 
deterministic partial equilibrium model with exogenously determined demand functions, 
homogenous agents, no transmission costs, no intra period time varying demand, no storage 
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possibilities, fully divisible capacity and no competitive element. Relaxing these assumptions 
is too complicated to be treated carefully here. Finally, section 5 summarizes the implication 
for the Steiner results.  
!4!
2 The Peak Load Problem 
 
The peak-load problem deals with choosing the optimal pricing scheme for optimal output 
when there is a non-storable good whose demand fluctuates periodically (and stochastically) 
at a uniform price, which is a characterization of electric utility. Output refers to a unit of 
electricity. In the long-run planning point of view the problem also deals with optimal 
capacity of the system, as opposed to short-run point of view where the existing capacity is 
fixed an thus not subject to determination. The systems capacity of supplying electricity to 
customers consists of the plants generation capacity and the capacity of the transmission 
network connecting generators and consumers. The systems capacity refers to the maximum 
supply the system can provide without the line being damaged by the heat created due to 
resistance. For the rest of the article, capacity refers to the capacity of the system.  
 
The issue with periodically varying demand of non-storable goods is the resulting 
underutilization of capacity over a cycle. A cycle (e.g. a day, week, season, year) is broken 
into multiple periods, where the peak period has the highest total demand of output and 
where the off-peak periods are the remaining periods. For electricity, demand and supply 
have to be in a continuous equilibrium to avoid power outage, thus capacity must be of such a 
size at least covering the peak-demand of the system. The peak demand dictates the size of 
generators, transmission lines and transformers even if peak demand is only for a small 
interval of time. Power outage occurs when peak demand exceeds the maximum supply 
levels that the electrical power industry can generate. Due to its specific nature, capacity 
cannot be varied to the extent that demand varies. Thus, peak demand requires the installation 
of additional capacity, which is under-utilized over the remainder of the cycle. Since capacity 
is not costless, the resulting idleness during the off peak is the basis for the peak-load 
problem and the motivation for pricing to mitigate this inefficiency.  
 
An essential assumption for pricing being an effective instrument is that demand is not totally 
physical given but also depends on price. If the opposite were true, there would be “neither 
difficulty nor interest in the peak-load problem” (Steiner, 1957, p. 588). There would be no 
effect on output of any change in prices and thus one scheme of prices would be equivalent to 
any other. A natural assumption is therefore that prices may affect demand at any point in 
time, the higher price the lower demand and visa versa. 
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Andersson and Bohman (1985, p. 281) points out that since it takes several years to build a 
power plant, it becomes important to make a “clear distinction between investment rules to 
reach an efficient capacity for such a long term perspective and pricing rules for the short run, 
i.e. when capacity is given”. The distinction between the peak-load pricing models where 
capacity is regarded fixed, and the peak load-pricing model where capacity is subject to 
determination will be central to the discussion in this paper.  
 
Whether capacity is subject to determination or treated as fixed depends on the time point of 
view due to the long installation- and construction time. At the stage of the investment 
decision, future capacity could be regarded as fully variable. That is, capacity is variable and 
subject to determination in the long-run planning point of view. Notice that, investment 
decision about capacity is not at a marginal level but between a “definite, indivisible 
increases in capacity or non at all” (Andersson and Bohman, 1985, p. 281). However, 
capacity can be fixed in a long-term perspective. After the investment decision is made, the 
investments are (at least partially) irreversible and future capacity (partially) fixed. At any 
moment of time the existing capacity of the utility (at that time) is fixed. That is, capacity is 
fixed in the short run.  
 
Periodically varying demand  
The demand for electricity is subject to rapid variations over time of day, over the week and 
over seasons. Electricity use follows a daily cycle as well as a yearly cycle due to climatic 
change. This variation in demand is present even if price is the same over time. A peak 
demand for electricity may occur during daytime hours at a given price while demand 
slackens greatly during night-time of off-peak hours at the same price. 
 
The total demand of a system can be described by a load duration curve, which gives 
information about the maximum demand of the system (the peak load) and its duration. A 
load curve order the systems demand data chronologically, while a load duration curve 
illustrates the demand data (kW) in descending order of magnitude, with the largest load to 
the left. The peak load is thus the maximum load of an electrical power-supply system at any 
point in time, literally the point at which the demand hits its peak. The hours with lowest 
consumption show the base load. In between is the shoulder or intermediate load. The off-
peak load refers to the sum of base- and shoulder load. An example of a (smoothed) load- and 
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a load duration curve is shown in figure 1. The area under the curve is the total usage of 
electricity during the cycle. 
 
 
Figure 1: The load curve (left hand) and load duration curve (right hand)  !
To avoid power outage, capacity has to be greater than or equal to maximum demand at each 
point in time, and supply has to be in a continuous equilibrium to demand. To meet demand 
at the peak would require the installation of capacity !∗, which is under-utilized over the 
remainder of the cycle. The shaded areas in figure 1 are the underutilized capacity over the 
cycle in question, and the area a pricing scheme searches to minimize.  Non-storability and 
periodic demand fluctuations result in partial underutilization of the total capacity available 
in a cycle (shaded area), and this inefficiency is the core of the peak-load problem. The 
variation in demand is one of the underlying causes to peak load problem. If demand were 
constant over time (would be illustrated by a horizontal load- and load-duration curve) the 
capacity would be fully utilized over the cycle, and the peak load problem would not exist. 
Steiner (1957, p. 587) remarks that “a peak load problem will be said to exist at any price, if 
the quantities demanded in the two periods at that price are unequal”.  
 
Non-storability  
Unlike most products, electricity cannot be stored after it is generated; it must be generated at 
the time of demand. The non-storability serves as the other background to the existence of the 
peak-load problem; Lewis (1941a, p. 250) explains that if storage were possible the peak-load 
problem would be mitigated or not exists at all, as illustrated in figure 2. When storage is 
possible the capacity requirement is reduced to !∗∗. Area B corresponds to pre-production in 
periods where demand for output is lower than the installed capacity can produce, and is 
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saved to the excess demand in periods compromising area A. When A and B are equal the 
peak-load problem is fully mitigated if the cost of storage is insignificant. However, as 
describes by Nguyen (1976), if the cost of storage is not insignificant, the possibility of 
storage modifies, but does not eliminate the peak load problem. The peak- price will exceed 
off-peak price by the cost of storage. As e.g. noted by Mohring (1970, p. 693) the inability of 
storage implies that the production process should satisfy the demand in real time.   
 
 
Figure 2: The load curve and load duration curve when storage is possible 
 
Storability in the pure sense refers to pre-production, which is not possible with regard to 
electricity. (One exception is storage in batteries, though these may be considered as storage 
of chemical energy and not electricity). However, as pointed out by Gravelle (1976, p. 261, 
footnote 1) it is possible to transform electricity to other forms of power, and then back to 
electricity again at a later time. One example is regular hydropower reservoir, where water is 
stored in the reservoirs and transformed to electricity when water is released. Even if storage 
of electricity at some degree is possible, this is outside the scope of this paper and non-
storability will be assumed throughout the paper1. The Steiner model is typically related to a 
system of conventional generating plants and not a system of hydropower where storage may 
be technological possible.  
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For peak-load models where storage is possible see e.g. Gravelle (1976), Nugyen (1976) 
and Asbury and Mueller (1978). 
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Uncertainty and dynamics  
In real life both the demand- and supply side is subject to uncertainty2. The demand of 
electricity is subject to random fluctuations due to the dependence on random components as 
weather and temperature among others. Whereas the supply of electricity depends on 
stochastic elements as broken lines, accidents, non-planned maintenance, plant breakdowns 
and component failure. Also the inputs for the different generations are random in nature, for 
solar power the sun is random, for wind power the wind is random, and for hydropower the 
rainfall is random. Kjølle et al (2007, p. 4) note that the uncertainty elements of the supply 
side have partially been mitigated by the introduction of revenue caps (the Cost of Energy 
Not Supplied arrangement3) in Norway 2001.  
 
The real world is also characterised by dynamics. The world is such that demand and 
technology changes over time, so it is unrealistic to consider a static world. Demands may be 
subject to growth due to increasing population or changes consumption pattern. Technology 
may be improved over time such that capacity built in the future will be more cost efficient 
than the ones today, which will affect investment decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 For a peak-load model with uncertainty see e.g. Kleindorfer and Fernando (1993). 
3 The CENS arrangement is a model for incentive based regulation of supply quality, where 
the main objective is to give the network owners incentive to “plan, operate and maintain 
their networks in a socio-economic optimal way and thereby provide a socio-economic 
optimal level of reliability” (Kjølle, 2009).  
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3 Steiner’s model and assumptions 
 
Section 3.1 provides the graphics of the Steiner model. For pedagogic reasons a uniform 
pricing scheme assumed to cover total costs is used for comparison as done by Ault and 
Ekelund (1987, pp. 653-654) and Bergstrom and MacKie-Mason (1991). Section 3.2 derives 
a modern method of solving the Steiner’s optimization problem. Section 3.3 list additional 
underlying assumptions of the model not mention by Steiner explicit. This section is based on 
comments and critiques by subsequent economists as well as my own. Section 3.4 summarize 
and decompose the peak-load pricing results, which the extended models in the following 
chapter will be compared to. Bailey (1972, p. 665) is the inspiration for the decomposition.   
 
3.1 The Steiner Model  
Steiner (1957, p. 585) seeks “to find an appropriate price policy that leads to the correct 
amount of physical capacity and its efficient utilization, and that also covers the full social 
costs of the resources used”. It is evident that he only focuses on the long-run planning point 
of view, because capacity is to be determined: “our problem consists in determining the 
amount of capacity ab initio” (p. 588). It is assumed that the objective is to maximize social 
welfare in the market for electricity, and this assumption is implemented formally by 
maximizing the sum of consumers and producers’ surplus.  
 
Steiner considers a cycle divided in two-time periods of equal length, where his example is 
that of day and night. Fluctuating demand is captured by splitting the demand for output into 
two different periods, each with different known demand curves. It is further assumed that 
each demand curve being a declining function of the quantity of output in that period alone, 
that the two demand curves are not identical, are independent of each other, and that the 
demand curve for output in the first period lies everywhere above that in the second period. 
Where independent demand means that a price change in one period does not affect the 
demand in the other period.  
 
Steiner makes the simple assumption about technology that only one type of plant is available 
of meeting demand. Let ! be the per-cycle constant cost of providing a unit of capacity, and ! is the constant operating cost of supplying a unit of output per period. Steiner further says: 
!10!
“From the long-run (planning) point of view the marginal cost of a unit of output is thus ! if 
there is excess capacity and ! + !! if it requires new capacity”. This long-run marginal cost 
function is discontinuous, where the marginal cost jumps from ! when there is excess 
capacity to ! + ! when an additional unit of capacity is required to increase output.  
 
Steiner’s aim is to determine optimal output !! in each period ! and the prices !! !that will lead 
buyers to purchase these quantities, and optimal capacity. Considering the determination of 
capacity, Steiner (1957, p. 587) says “the amount of capacity that is required is the maximum 
output in either period – that is, the maximum (or peak) demand on the system”. That is 
optimal capacity in the Steiner model is simply found where equal to the peak load.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Uniform pricing 
The two-period problem is given in figure 3, in which the demand curves for output in period 
1 and 2 respectively, !! and !! are drawn. At any uniform price the demanded quantity in 
period 1 would be higher than for period 2, which follows from the assumption that the 
demand curve for period 1 lies everywhere above the demand curve for period 2. Hence, 
period 1 is the peak-load period and period 2 the off-peak period. An arbitrary uniform rate ! 
would require a capacity of ! = !! units of capacity to serve the peak users. At rate !, off-
peak demand would be !! leaving !! − !! units of capacity idle in the off-peak periods. As  
 
 
 
!!
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3.1.1 The Firm Peak case 
 
 
Figure 4: Optimal solution to the firm peak case 
Given the demand curves,!! and ! in figure 44, Steiner argues that welfare optimality requires 
pricing at !! = ! + ! and !! = ! leading to period outputs !!∗ and !!∗ and capacity ! = !!∗. 
As Steiner (1957, p. 589) explains: “since the marginal capacity is that of users in period 1 
only, the appropriate price for period 1 is !! = ! + !. This capacity would be justified even 
if there were no demand in period 2. Hence period 2 users should be permitted to purchase 
output as long as they cover the operating costs of producing that (…) [output]”.  
 
Comparing the solution at prices !! = ! + ! and !! = ! with the solution of some uniform 
pricing scheme, between ! and ! + ! assumed to cover total costs, we see that off-peak load 
is increased and peak load is reduced with the resulting better utilization of capacity in the 
off-peak period, and lower capacity requirements in the peak-period.  
 
Figure 4 illustrate that the relationship between !  and !  is ! ≈ !!! . Notice, that this 
relationship is dependent on the specific illustration in figure 4 and is not a general !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The reason for not reviewing the original graphical explanation of Steiner is due to his 
unconventional formulation of subtracting the operational costs ! from the demand curves for 
output, which leads to at least two problems. First, the demand are then for “capacity” instead 
of output, which are misleading. Second, ! is taken as the zero axes. This implies that ! is 
erased from the graphics resulting in a pedagogical challenge when trying to connect his 
figures to his mathematical optimality results. !
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relationship between those two. Another relationship between ! and ! could easily have been 
illustrated. 
 
According to the specific demand curves, operational cost ! and capacity cost ! in figure 4, 
pricing at !! = ! + ! and !! = ! does not reverse the peak/off-peak pattern of period 1 
being the peak load period. Thus, Steiner calls this case the firm-peak case (firm in the sense 
of unchanged relative to uniform prices), because period 1 is still the peak load period. Even 
though only running cost is charged in the off-peak period this is not sufficient for capacity to 
be utilized in the off-peak period and spare capacity always exists in the firm peak case. The 
pricing scheme !! = ! + ! and !! = ! is the prices the extended models are to be compared 
to.  
 
3.1.2 The Shifting Peak case 
Additional to the firm-peak case Steiner also considers a case called the shifting-peak case, 
which is when the demand reaction of pricing at !! = ! + ! and !! = ! shift the peak load 
period from being period 1 to period 2, and the pricing scheme above is no longer optimal. 
As explicit pointed out by Crew et al (1995, p. 221) this may be the case with another 
relationship between the demand curves or when capacity cost ! in figure 4 is increased. The 
shifting-peak case has been subject to considerable attention in the early peak-load pricing 
literature (see Bye (1929), Lewis (1941b), Hirshleifer (1958), Williamson (1966), Gabor 
(1966) and Buchanan (1966)). However, as far as I can judge, the peak-load problem is 
exclusively related to the firm-peak case from the 1970s. The shifting peak case will not be 
considered as it is outside the scope of this paper.  
 
A topic for further research would be to study the relevance of the shifting peak case and why 
it have achieved considerable attention in the early peak-load pricing theory and so little 
attention nowadays.  
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3.2 Mathematical background 
Steiner (1957, p. 604) derives the following mathematical background for his analysis. Let !! ≥ 0 be quantity of output in period ! and !! be the corresponding market price for this 
quantity. I will follow the simplified approach of a two-period model throughout the thesis. 
Price and quantity are related by the function !! !!  which is the valuation of the marginal 
units in the respective periods, assumed continuous, differentiable and !!′ !! < 0!∀!. Steiner 
(1957, p. 608) let !! = !! !!  for all !. Steiner’s original maximization problem is: 
 
 max!! !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!! − !!max! ( !!) !!!!!!!!! = 1,2 (1) 
Where capacity ! is simply set equal to the peak load ! = max!( !!).  
 
Before solving the maximization problem three comments are worth making. First, it is 
naturally to interpret !! !!  as the inverse demand curve for output in period !, which is the 
highest price the aggregated customers are willing to pay for different quantities of output. 
Second, the Steiner assumption “that the demand curve for output in the first period lies 
everywhere above that in the second period” can be formulated as: !! ! > !! !  for all 
quantity of output !. Notice that Steiner in his original maximization problem used the 
expression !!!!! !! !!!!!!!  instead of !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! . The last formulation 
specify that the upper integral sign refers to a specific number and !!′ to the independent 
variable in general.  
 
Summarizing, the maximizing problem can be restated as: 
 max!!,! !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!! − !!"  
subject to !! = !! !!  !! ! > !! !  ! = !max! ( !!) !! ,! > 0 !,!!!"#$%, ! = 1,2 
(2) 
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Due to the specific formulation of the Steiner objective function, some initial assumption 
about !! and !! must be made to determine max!( !!). For the firm-peak case we have !! > !!  by definition, this is in an assumption and not the result of the maximization 
problem. Thus, max!( !!) = !!and the total justified capacity is ! = !! while capacity is 
underutilized in the off-peak period ! < !! , all by definition. The corresponding 
maximization problem to the assumption !! > !! could be stated as: 
 max!! !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!! − !!!! , ! = 1,2! (3) 
We obtain the following result as Steiner does5 
 !! = ! + !, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! = ! (4) 
 
Peak price consist of marginal operating costs including cost of marginal capacity, while off-
peak price is equal to marginal operating costs.  
 
The breakeven property 
Due to the linear operating and capacity costs the production process is characterized by 
constant returns to scale. For constant returns to scale, pricing at (4) will yield total revenues 
just sufficient to cover total costs. More specific, the profit function for the two-period firm 
peak case is given by: 
 ! = !!!!!!!! − !!!!!!! − !!! (5) 
Prices (4) inserted in (5) gives: 
 ! = ! + ! !! + !!! − !!! − !!! − !!! = 0!! (6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Remembering that !!!! !!!!! !!′ !!!′ = !! !! . 
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Period 2 
3.3 Comments 
As noted by Crew et al (1995) the demand within each period is flat, so that in Steiner’s case 
where there are two periods, say day and night, the demand is identical during each of the 
hours at day, and the same for the night6. When the demand within each period is flat and 
only one peak period and one off-peak period exists, the load curve and load duration curve 
are identical and stepwise instead of smooth. The assumption of peak demand existent for 
half of the cycle may be regarded as unrealistic, as it is more realistic to let the maximum 
demand of the system to only occur at a small amount of time. Gallant and Koenker (1984) 
notes that the two-period approach obscures some of the fine structure of the peak load 
problem: times at which local extrema occur, periods of extremely price sensitive demand, 
etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The load curve and load duration curve for the Steiner model 
 
Bye (1929, p. 44, footnote 3) points out that when considering a demand curve we assume 
that production follow demands, not needs. The demand curves for each period and the peak 
period are exogenously given and the consumer’s choices are not modelled (i.e. by using 
utility functions). That is, the model does not explain why the demand is higher in the first 
period than in the second. Period 1 is the peak-period by definition and not a result of the 
model.  
 
Implicit in the Steiner model is the assumption of all power plants and consumers located in 
the same place, i.e. no transport/transmission costs, when in reality generators and consumers !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See Dansby (1978) for a model that relax the assumption of constant demand within each 
price period and allow for intraperiod time varying demand. 
Period 1 
1 cycle 
Load 
!!!
! = !!!!
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are spatially distributed7. In the Steiner model output and capacity is measured along the 
same axis implying that capacity can be divided into output units, i.e. there is an underlying 
assumption of fully divisible capacity as noted by Bailey (1972, p. 666). Andersson and 
Bohman (1985, p. 281) note that there is an underlying assumption of capacity in the long run 
being “continuously variable both when expanding and contracting it”.  
 
As noted by Turvey (1968, p. 103) and Lioukas (1983, p. 14) an implicit assumption of the 
Steiner model is that capacity is the same in all periods of the demand cycle. Steiner thus 
neglects that available capacity is not always equal to installed capacity, e.g. due to planned 
maintenance. Moreover, Turvey (1968, p. 102) notes that the capacity costs are pure peak-
related. Underlying the formulation !max!( !!) in the welfare function is the assumption that 
off-peak customers are not charged the capacity costs even if capacity also serves the off-
peak customers.  
 
Crew et al (1995, p. 217) point out that in the welfare function (1) we find the assumption of 
equal valuation of benefit to the producers and consumers; the social planner is indifferent to 
the income redistribution effect. Baumol and Bradford (1970, p. 265) argue that the welfare-
maximizing social planner may be a reasonable approximation of an economy in which all 
industry has been nationalized and in which the central planning agency is dedicated to the 
maximization of social welfare.  
 
Williamson (1966, p. 811) notes that the Steiner model illustrate the first-best solution for the 
social planner and there is an underlying assumption of “all of the optimum conditions of 
production and exchange are satisfied elsewhere in the economy” because “some such 
assumption is necessary if we are to avoid second best digressions”.  
 
Underlying the Steiner model is also the assumption that is it technological possible and 
profitable to actually charge the marginal cost prices as involving one price for each period. 
This is an unreasonable assumption for bulk usage meters, which are only capable of 
measuring the amount of energy consumed but not the time at which is it used. However, for 
smart meter this is a more reasonable assumption. Joskow and Wolfram (2012) explains that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See Arellano and Serra (2007) for a peak-load pricing model including transmission costs in 
a context of a two-node, two-technology electric power system.  
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a smart meter measure consumption of electricity in short intervals and automatically 
communicates that information back to the utility for billing purposes. The smart meter also 
receive information about electricity costs and give consumers information about their own 
usage. In this way customers will be able to manage their consumption. The Norwegian 
Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE, 2014) has informed that within 1st of January 
2019 Smart meters should be in use in Norway. Whether end-use consumers actually face 
retail prices that reflect the variations in marginal generation costs depend on the metering 
technology available. There is also an underlying assumption that the consumers know the 
prices, i.e. prices set ex ante, when in real life electricity (sport) market price is set ex-post.  
 
The Steiner model is a partial equilibrium model, where the clearance of the market in 
question is obtained independently from prices and quantities in other markets, and the 
clearance does not affect prices and quantities in other markets. This makes analysis much 
simpler than in a general equilibrium model, which includes an entire economy. Weakness is 
of course that the interrelations to the rest of the economy are disregarded.  
 
 
3.4 The Steiner peak-load pricing result  
Peak load pricing involves charging different prices for electricity in different time intervals 
aiming to mitigate the inefficiency of underutilized capacity over the cycle. Relatively high 
price in the peak-demand period reduces the peak-demand and thus also the need for capacity 
investments. Comparatively, low price in the off-peak period is charged encouraging demand 
thereby making better use of capacity.  
 
The peak-load pricing advocated by Steiner could be decomposed into 4 results: 
 
Result 1: Set one price in each pricing period in accordance with the pattern of 
demand and long-run marginal cost of generating electricity.  
 
(Where one price means that any multiple tariff is not considered, and where patterns 
of demand refers to that any customer in a particular hour be treated the same 
regardless on how much he consumes.) 
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Result 2: Charge high prices when consumption tends to rise above the level of the 
capacity to discouraging use of electricity, and charge lower prices in periods with 
excess capacity to encourage demand.  
 
Result 3: Allocate capacity cost only to those customers who contribute to additional 
capacity needs. Thus, the peak users bear all of the capacity costs and no 
responsibility for capacity cost is imputed to the off-peak customers whose aggregated 
demand does not press upon capacity.  
 
Result 4: Optimal capacity is simply found where capacity is equal to the demand in 
the peak-period.  
 
(Strictly speaking result 4 is not a result from the Steiner model, it is a definition) 
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4 How later economists have developed the 
Steiner Model 
 
4.1 The short-run solution and capacity constraint 
Hirshleifer (1958) and Williamson (1966) separated the short run and long run aspect of the 
problem and thus provided a more general solution than Steiner, who only considers the long-
run planning point of view. Section 4.1.1 reviews the mathematical formulation of a peak-
load problem distinguishing between the short-run peak load problem where capacity is 
fixed, i.e. an exogenous variable denoted !, and the long-run peak-load problem where 
capacity is variable and subject to determination (planning point of view), i.e. and 
endogenous variable denoted! . Williamson (1966) is the inspiration for this section. Instead 
of capacity initially set equal to the maximum demand. He uses a capacity constraint that 
restricts the amount supplied in any period to its capacity. Section 4.1.2 reviews the graphics 
consistent with the mathematical formulation in 4.1.1. Hirshleifer (1958, p. 456, footnote 9) 
is the inspiration for the illustrations. Section 4.1.3 compare the findings with the Steiner 
peak-load pricing results.  
 
4.1.1 Mathematical formulation 
 
The short-run solution 
When capacity is fixed the only decision is of pricing optimality within the capacity 
constraint !. Assumed operation is profitable the short-run maximization problem is: 
 max!! !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!! ! 
subject to !! = !! !!  !! ! > !! !  !! ≤ ! !! > 0 !,!!!"#$%, ! = 1,2!! 
(7) 
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Notice that ! is not part of the short-run problem because capacity is fixed. The installation 
of new capacity is only related to the long-run problem and therefore also the cost of new 
capacity !. The Lagrangian for the problem is: 
 ! !! = ! !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!! − !!(!! −!!!! !)  
 
Endogenous variables are !! and !! (! = 1,2). The necessary first-order conditions are: 
 !" !!!!! = !! − ! − !! = 0!! (8) 
  !! ≥ 0, = 0!!"#!!! < !  (9) 
 
where !! !is the shadow price on capacity, which is the change in the objective function 
maximized with respect to !! of a marginal increase in the capacity constraint !. The shadow 
price on capacity can be interpreted as the marginal valuation of (i.e. the willingness to pay 
for) one extra unit of capacity. If demanded output is equal to the maximum amount existing 
capacity can provide in period!! (!! = !) the willingness to pay for one extra unit of capacity 
in period ! is positive (!! > 0). (I disregard the mathematical possibility of zero willingness 
to pay when production is at the capacity limit.) If there already exists unused capacity for 
production in period ! (!! < !), the willingness to pay for one extra unit of capacity in that 
period is naturally zero (!! = 0).  
 
Generally, optimal prices leading to optimal output is found where the marginal valuation of 
output is equal to the sum of marginal operating cost and the shadow price on capacity. 
 !! = ! + !! (10) 
 
Specifically, when production is at its maximum in period 1 !! = !  and there are unused 
capacity in period 2 !! < !  we have !! = 0 and !! > 0, and the optimal solution for each 
period ! given capacity ! is:  
 !! = ! + !!,!!!!!!!!! = !!!!!!!!!! (11) 
 
Williamson (1966, p. 813) points out that the relationship between !!  and ! signals the 
investment direction. If the willingness to pay for one additional unit of capacity is larger 
than the actual cost of installing an additional unit of capacity (!! > !) then an expansion of 
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a plant is signalled. If the opposite is true (!! < !), Williamson says that plant should be 
“retired” rather than renewed until equality between !!  and !  are restored. This is a 
misinterpretation because the relationship between benefit (!!) and cost (!) only signals 
whether to invest or not. Williamson does not specify what is meant by “retiring”, could e.g. 
either be to scrap of resell capacity. In either way, if applied to reality this is unreasonable 
since excess capacity may be used due to unforeseen changes and future increase in demand, 
and resell a plant require a second-hand market for capacity. Williamson’s statement is 
highly related to the assumption of a deterministic and static world. When the willingness to 
pay for one additional unit of capacity is smaller than the actual cost of installing an 
additional unit of capacity is simply that an expansion of plant is not signalled.  
 
The long-run solution 
The long-run maximization problem is formulated as:  
 
 max!!,! !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!! − !!" !! 
subject to !! = !! !!  !! ! > !! !  !! ≤ ! !! ,! > 0 !,!"#$%&, ! = 1,2!! 
(12) 
 
The corresponding Lagrangian is: 
 ! !! ,! = ! !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!! − !!" − !!(!! −!!!! !)!!  
 
Endogenous variables are !! ,! and !! (! = 1,2). The necessary first-order conditions are: 
 !" !! ,!!!! = !! − ! − !! = 0 (13) 
 !" !! ,!!" = −! + !!!!!! = 0 (14) 
 !! ≥ 0, = 0!!"#!!! < !  (15) 
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According to equation (14) optimal capacity is found where the cost of an additional capacity 
unit ! is offset by the sum of the marginal valuation of that capacity for both periods !!!!!! . 
Prices are still set as for the short-run solution (see equation (10)), because at any moment in 
time capacity at that time is fixed.  
 
Specifically, let !! = !  and !! < ! , then !! = 0 and !! > 0. According to (14) optimal 
capacity is found where the marginal willingness to pay for capacity by customers in period 1 
is equal to the cost of one extra unit of capacity, that is ! = !!. Optimal prices when capacity 
is optimized is equal to the prices Steiner advocate: !! = ! + ! and !! = !. I will refer to 
these prices as long-run prices, as they are optimal prices for a cycle in the long-run planning 
point of view where capacity is optimized, i.e. where ! = !!. 
 
4.1.2 Graphical representation 
 
Figure 6: The short and long run solution 
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Figure 6 illustrates the short-and long run solution of the previous section 4.1.1. The marginal 
cost curve of meeting an additional unit of electricity consumption is different for the short- 
and long-run planning point of view8. The short-run marginal cost (!!"#) curve is the cost 
of meeting an additional unit of electricity consumption when capacity is fixed, and is 
derived from the short-run maximization problem (7).  
 !"#$ = ! + !! (16) 
 
The long-run marginal cost (!"#$ ) curve is the cost of providing an increase in 
consumption when optimal capacity adjustments are possible, and is derived from the long-
run maximisation problem (12).  
 !"#$ = ! + ! (17) 
 
Let !!  be the existing capacity and assume !! = !!  and !! < !! . Because off-peak 
production is below the capacity limit the willingness to pay for an additional unit of capacity 
in period 2 is zero (!!! = 0). Because the capacity level is reached in period 1 the willingness 
to pay for an additional unit of capacity is positive in period 1 (!!! > 0). Optimal price for 
each period ! to given capacity !! is found where the demand curve for each period crosses 
the curve !"#$! = ! + !!!:  
 !!! = !, !!! = ! + !!! > ! + ! (18) 
The willingness to pay for an additional unit of capacity in period 1 (!!!) is larger than the 
actual cost of installing a unit of capacity, signalling an expansion of the capacity (!). To 
ensure peak-demand is within the capacity limits a price sufficient higher than ! + ! is 
charged.  
 
For the long-run planning point of view optimal capacity is found where the willingness to 
pay for an additional unit of capacity equals the marginal cost of installing that unit, which is 
the case for capacity !! and its shadow price !!!. After establishment of the optimal capacity, 
prices should be set as in the short run. The optimal short-run solution for given capacity !! 
is found where the demand curve for each period crosses the !"#$! = ! + !!!: 
 
 !!! = !, !!! = ! + !!! = ! + ! (19) 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 See Andersson and Bohman (1985) for more about the short-and long-run marginal cost.  
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4.1.3 Implication for the Steiner result 
Compared to the Steiner model two changes have occurred. First, the short-run aspect of the 
problem has been separated from the long run. The Steiner results are all related to the long-
run planning point of view. Steiner does not discuss the short-run problem since he 
concentrates his attention upon the problem of installing and charging for capacity. Second, a 
capacity constraint has replaced the Steiner formulation of ! = max!( !!). The Steiner 
formulation requires an initial assumption about !!  and !!  to be able to solve the 
maximization problem (1) and information about the shadow prices on capacity is lost. When 
a capacity constraint is used, the relevant maximization problem is first solved then an 
assumption about !! and !! is made to get the specific prices for each period. This method 
ensures that the shadow price on capacity is included in the analysis.  
 
These changes have had the following implications for the Steiner result. First, as the new 
method have shown, result 1 should be further specified that prices are to be set according to 
short-run marginal cost. The demand for electricity exhibits substantial variations over 
periods of time too short to permit capacity to be varied so as to keep price continuously 
equal to long-run marginal cost. For the short-run peak load problem result 3 of the Steiner 
model is no longer valid. Installing and charging for capacity is only related to the long-run 
peak load problem because capacity is fixed in the short run.  
 
The use of a capacity constraint gives additional information about the capacity rule, result 4. 
In the Steiner model optimal capacity was simply found (or, strictly speaking – defined) 
where equal to demand in the peak period when prices were chosen optimally. With the new 
formulation of (12) capacity is still equal to the demand in the peak load period. However, 
optimal capacity is found according to equation (14), where the sum of marginal willingness 
to pay for one additional capacity unit over the periods is equal to the actual cost of the 
capacity unit.  
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4.2  The problem of deficits – The breakeven welfare-
maximization model  
 
Williamson (1966, p. 827) points out that if there are “increasing or decreasing returns to 
scale exists, or if capacity is given rather than subject to determination, optimal pricing will 
yield the zero net revenue result only accidentally if at all”. Revenues are normally required 
to cover total costs despite the presence of fixed capacity or increasing economies of scale. 
Therefore a breakeven constraint is imposed (assumed a two-part tariff is not allowed) to 
ensure the firm at least breaks even in its operations: 
 ! ≥ 0!!  
 
Crew et al (1995), Bailey and White (1974), Bailey (1972) and Pressman (1970) assumes that 
a monopolist supply electricity. The profit of a monopolist: 
 ! = !! !! !! − !"!!!!   
 
Section 4.2.1 explains why fixed capacity in the long-run point of view without any 
breakeven constraint will give zero net revenue only accidently. Thereafter, the breakeven 
constraint will be imposed and new pricing rules are introduced. Section 4.2.2 explains why 
non-linear costs may imply deficits in the absent of a breakeven constraint. Thereafter, the 
solution with a breakeven constraint is given using the cost function of Bailey and White 
(1974). Pressman (1970), Bailey (1972), Mohring (1970, pp. 696-698) and Bailey and White 
(1974) are the inspiration for section 4.2.2, and I will summarize their achievements in a 
unified framework. Section 4.2.3 reviews the implication for the Steiner results.  
 
Notice, that the problem of deficits is related to the long-run peak load problem.  
 
4.2.1 Capacity fixed in the long-run 
Consider the long-run peak load problem where capacity for some reason is fixed in the long 
run. Capacity may be fixed e.g. due to irreversible past investment decisions, which still have 
to be paid for by the customers.  
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 Max!! !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!! − !!!  
subject to !! = !! !!  !! ! > !! !  !! ≤ ! !! > 0 !,!,!!!"#$%, ! = 1,2!! 
(20) 
 
The solution is equal to the short-run solution for fixed capacity (8) and (9). The profit to 
prices (8) and (9) when !! = ! and !! < ! is: 
 ! = !!!!!!!! − !!!!!!! − !! = !!!! − !! = !(!! − !)!!  
 
Only when !! = !  (i.e. when capacity is optimized) the monopoly breaks even in its 
operations. In the long-run planning point of view capacity could be fully adjusted so that 
optimum capacity happens and firm break even. For the long run when capacity is fixed !! = ! occur only by accident, and the Steiner prices may not be optimal. Deficits occur 
when the monopolies supplying electricity is forced to fix the price at the marginal short-run 
cost, and the past irreversible investments customers have to pay for is larger than their 
willingness to pay (!! < !).  
 
Imposing the breakeven constraint  
The long-run optimization problem to fixed capacity with the breakeven constraint imposed: 
 max!! !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!! − !!!  
subject to ! = !! !! !! −!!!! !!!!!!! − !!! ≥ 0 !! ≤ ! !! = !! !!  !! ! > !! !  !! > 0 !,!,!!!"#$%, ! = 1,2!! 
(21) 
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The Lagrangian for the problem is:  
 ! !! = ! !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!! − !!! − !!(!! −!!!! !)+ ! !! !! !! −!!!! !!!!!!! − !!! !!  
 
Endogenous variables are !! , !!  and !!  ( ! = 1,2 ). Where !  is the shadow price on the 
breakeven constraint, the reduction in the objective function maximized with respect to !! of 
a marginally increase in profit requirement 0. If the profit requirement is increase (reduced) 
by 1-dollar then social welfare is reduces (increased) with ! dollars.  
 
The necessary first-order conditions are: 
 !" !!!!! = !! − ! − !! + ! !! !! + !!! !!!!! !! − ! = 0!!! (22) 
  !! ≥ 0, = 0!!"#!!! < !  (23) 
  ! ≥ 0, = 0!!"#!! > 0  (24) !
The expression for optimal price to fixed capacity ! (22) could be rewritten as (se appendix 
B1):  
 !! = ! + !!1+ !1− !1+ ! 1!! !! (25) 
 
Where !! = − !!!! !!!!!! > 0 is the elasticity of the price of good ! with respect to changes in its 
quantity. The price elasticity is the percentage reduction in demanded quantity for a good 
when price of that good is increased by one per cent. Compared to the first-best prices (10) 
prices are raised in inverse proportion to the absolute value of the price elasticity.  
 
Specifically, when !! = ! and !! < ! (25) gives:  
 !! = ! + !!1+ !1− ! 1!! , !! = !1− ! 1!!  (26) 
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Where, according to Crew et al (1995, p. 219), ! = !!!! (! ∈ 0,1 ) is the so-called Ramsey 
number, which is positive except at the welfare optimum when the breakeven constraint is 
non-binding. The larger ! the larger is the Ramsey number, and the larger prices relative to 
the first-best prices (10). When the breakeven constraint is non-binding (! > 0) then ! = 0 
implying ! = 0, and prices are equal to the first-best prices (10). When the breakeven 
constraint is binding (! > 0) then ! > 0 and the breakeven welfare-maximizing prices are 
larger than the first-best prices. The breakeven welfare-maximizing prices deviates the most 
from first-best prices (10) when ! = ∞, which implies ! = 1. (Control: lim!→! !(!!!) = 1). 
As will be shown, when!! = 1 the prices for the breakeven welfare-maximizing social 
planner is identical to the prices for an unregulated profit-maximizing solution. The 
maximum reduction in social welfare of a 1-dollar increase in the profit requirement (! = ∞) 
corresponds to the solution of an unregulated profit-maximising monopoly. Reducing the 
profit by 1-dollar will yield a substantial increase in social welfare.  
 
This particular rewriting of peak-and off-peak prices when a breakeven constraint is imposed 
is found in Crew et al (1995, p. 225). For other rewritings see Bailey and White (1974, p. 78), 
Boiteux (1971, p. 235) or Bradford and Baumol (1970, p. 270). 
 
4.2.2 Non-linear costs 
In the Steiner model the total cost of producing !! and !!!during period 1 and period 2 is 
clearly linear in production, ensuring the firm breaks even with marginal cost pricing. When 
we relax the assumption of linear cost function to a non-linear, the cost function may exhibit 
decreasing average costs, implying increasing returns, leading to deficits under marginal cost 
pricing. Pressman (1970), Bailey (1972) and Bailey and White (1974) consider a non-linear 
total cost function in their analysis.  
 
Table 1: Overview over functions for total costs 
 Total costs, !" 
Steiner (1957) !!! + !!"! + !!Q 
Pressman (1970) !! !!,! + !!! !!,! + ! !  
Bailey (1972) ! !!, !! − !"!!! 
Bailey and White (1974) !!! + !!"! + ! Q  
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Pressman (1970, p. 311) considers a non-linear total cost function where operating and 
capacity costs are not separable. The expression !! !! ,!  is the operating cost function for 
each period, and ! !  is the function for capacity cost.  Pressman does not specify the first-
and second order derivatives thus allowing both for increasing and decreasing returns to 
scale. Bailey (1972, p. 672) uses a cost function where operational- and capacity costs are 
separable. The function for operational costs are non-linear while the capacity cost function is 
linear. Derivatives are not specified. 
 
Bailey and White (1974, pp. 78-80) use a total cost function where operating and capacity 
costs are also separable. Only the capacity costs are non-linear and they assume increasing 
returns to scale in capacity provision !! Q > 0,!!! Q < 0. Notice that !!! Q < 0 may 
lead to convexity problems of the lagrangian. If the Lagrangian is concave in !! and ! the 
solution according to the necessary first order conditions are sufficient for solving the 
maximization problem. When !!! Q < 0  the lagrangian is convex in !  and the 
maximization problem may not have an unique solution. Bailey and White do not mention 
this difficulty. I will use their cost-function in the following, assuming the solution from the 
necessary first order conditions are unique despite !!! Q < 0.  
 
The maximization problem with non-linear capacity costs according to Bailey and White 
(1974) and no added constraints:  
 max!!,! !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!! − ! !  
subject to !! ≤ ! !! = !! !!  !! ! > !! !  !! ,! > 0 !,!!!"#$%, ! = 1,2! 
(27) 
 
 The Lagrangian for the problem is:  
 ! !! ,! = !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!! − ! ! − !!(!!!! !! − !)!!  
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Endogenous variables are !!, ! and !! (! = 1,2). The necessary first order conditions are: 
 !" !! ,!!!! = !! − ! − !! = 0!  
  !" !! ,!!" = !−!"!" + !!!!!! = 0!!  
  !! ≥ 0, = 0!!"#!!! < ! !!  
 
When !! = ! and !! < ! optimal capacity is found where !"!" = !! and optimal prices given 
optimal capacity is: 
 !! = ! + !"!" ,!!!!!!!!! − ! (28) 
 
Pricing according to (28) result in deficits because profit by marginal cost prices is:  
 ! = ! !"!" − !(!)! !!  
 
The relationship between marginal capacity cost and average capacity costs determine 
whether the profit are positive, negative or zero. Increasing returns to scale imply decreasing 
average costs, which imply negative profits. 
 !!" !(!)! < 0!⟺ ! 1! !"!" − ! !! < 0⟹ !"!" < ! !! ⟹ ! < 0  
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Imposing the breakeven constraint  
If a single price is all that can be levied for each type of customer, and if the firm is to break 
even the following maximization problem is appropriate: 
 Max!!,! !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!! − ! (!)  
subject to ! = !! !! !! −!!!! !!!!!!! − !!" ≥ 0 !! ≤ ! !! = !! !!  !! ! > !! !  !! ,! > 0 !,!!!"#$%, ! = 1,2 
(29) 
 
The Lagrangian for the problem is:  
 ! !! ,! = ! !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!! − ! (!)− !!(!! −!!!! !)+ ! !! !! !! −!!!! !!!!!!! − ! (!) !  
 
Endogenous variables are !!, !, !! and ! (! = 1,2). The necessary first-order conditions are: 
 !" !! ,!!!! = !! − ! − !! + ! !! !! + !!! !!!!! !! − ! = 0!!! (30) 
  !" !! ,!!" = −!" !!" + !!!!!! − ! !" !!" = 0 (31) 
  !! ≥ 0, = 0!!"#!!! < !  (32) 
  ! ≥ 0, = 0!!"#!! > 0  (33) 
 
Equation (30) is the optimal short-run prices and as it is identical to equation  (22) it may be 
rewritten according to (25). Equation (31) illustrates the optimal long-run capacity rule and 
may be rewritten as: 
 !!!!!! = (1+ !)!" !!" !!! (34) 
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When !! = ! and !! < ! optimal capacity is found where !! = (1+ !) !" !!"  and optimal 
prices given optimal capacity is: 
 !! = ! + !" !!"1− ! 1!! , !! = !1− ! 1!!  (35) 
Where, ! = !!!! (! ∈ 0,1 ) is the Ramsey number. 
 
4.2.3 Implication for the Steiner result 
Compared to the Steiner model two assumptions have been relaxed both leading to deficits. 
First, the Steiner assumption that capacity can be determined in the long run is relaxed. If 
capacity in the long run is fixed deficits may occur when the marginal capacity cost at the 
fixed capacity level is larger than the marginal willingness to pay for capacity in period 1. 
Second, when allowing for non-linear costs, deficits may occur due to increasing returns to 
scale. To ensure firm at least breaks even in its operations a breakeven constraint is imposed 
changing the optimal solution.   
 
These changes have had the following implications for the Steiner result. The first-best 
solution of price equal to (short-run) marginal cost of generation capacity is not attainable 
due to deficits. Maximizing total welfare under the condition of non-negative profit is called 
Ramsey pricing. Ramsey pricing produces a second-best solution, since the efficiency 
condition of price equal marginal cost is lost, which violate result 1. Prices is no longer only 
set in accordance with pattern of demand and (short-run) marginal cost of generation 
capacity. Prices are also dependent on elasticity of demand if the breakeven constraint is 
binding (! > 0). The social welfare will be maximized not by setting price equal or even 
proportional to marginal cost, but where products with elastic demands are priced at levels 
close to the marginal cost, and visa versa (i.e. the inverse elasticity rule). Ramsey pricing 
minimizes the welfare loss when the monopoly supplying electricity are required to break 
even.  
 
Notice also that the Steiner result 1 focus on one charge on peak users and one charge on off-
peak users. An alternative to the breakeven pricing rules formulated above is the use of two-
part or other non-linear tariffs; see for instance Lewis (1941a) or Bailey and White (1974, pp. 
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85-90), who introduce a model of peak-load pricing in which an entrance fee or customer 
charge as well as a peak and an off-peak usage charge is levied.  
 
Result 2 of peak-price higher than off-peak price may be violated when prices also depend on 
elasticity of demand. Bailey and White (1974, p. 74) refer to this as the pricing reversal 
phenomenon. The pricing reversal will occur if the demand in the off-peak period is 
sufficiently more inelastic than that during the peak so as to compensate at the margin for the 
attribution of capacity costs to the peak period. The existence of the pricing reversal is of 
course an empirical question. However, nothing as general as result 2 can be stated when 
relaxing the assumption of variable capacity in the long run and linear costs to be able to 
charge the higher prices (35).  
 
Result 4 about optimal capacity is extended when non-linear costs and breakeven constraint 
is imposed. Optimum capacity is found where the marginal willingness to pay for one 
additional unit of capacity in the peak-period is equal to the actual cost of installing one more 
unit of capacity multiplied with the shadow price on breakeven constraint. The optimum 
capacity level is reduced compared to the linear cost case.  
 
 
4.3 Dependent demand  
Steiner (1957, pp. 608-609) tries to extend the peak load problem to also include dependent 
demand by replacing !! !!  with !! !!, !!  keeping everything else unchanged. The 
consumer’s surplus:  
 ! = !! !!!, !!! !!!!!!!!!!! − !!!!!!!!  (36) 
 
Pressman (1970), who studies the peak-load problem with dependent demand, argues that 
this representation is inadequate because there is an underlying assumption of independent 
demand in the formulation of the consumer’s surplus (36). The consumer’s surplus used by 
Steiner is only valid when the demand for the !th good or service depends only on the 
quantity of that good or service, and not on any of the other n goods or service. The 
formulation of the consumer’s surplus has to be adapted to the dependent demand property.  
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For the case of two-periods and two-good Pressman (1970) shows the more convenient 
formulation of multi-dimensional consumers’ surplus with dependent demand by using a 
path-independent line integral of the form: 
 
 ! = !! !!!, !!! !!!!!!!! −!!,!!!,! !!!!!!!!  (37) 
 
Where the integration is being performed along some unspecified curve (“path”) between the 
points !!!, !!! = (0,0) and !!!, !!! = (!!, !!). The formula (37) does not specify the path 
to be integrated along. According to the Gradient Theorem (also known as the fundamental 
theorem of calculus for line integrals) the line integral is only dependent on the end points – 
i.e. independent of the path between them – if and only if !!,!!  is the gradient of some 
scalar function ! !!!, !!!  and !! and !! are of class !!.  
 
 !!!!!! = !!!!!! (38) 
 
Formula (38) is a necessary condition for the Gradient theorem to hold. The effect on peak 
period price resulting from a change in off-peak demand, is the same as the effect on off-peak 
period price resulting from a change in peak demand, that is when the income effects are 
negligible or zero. If (38) does not hold then !!,!!  is no gradient of ! resulting in path-
dependent line integral. However, when !!,!!  is the gradient of some scalar function ! !!!, !!! : ∇! = !"!!!! , !"!!!! = !!,!!  
 
Then, according to Young’s Theorem, the cross-derivatives of F are equal: 
 !!!!! !"!!!! = !!!!! !"!!!! ⟺ !!!!!!! = !!!!!!! 
 
Equation (38) follows when !!,!!  is the gradient of some scalar function ! !!!, !!! . 
Formula (38) is a sufficient condition for the Gradient theorem if !! and !! are of class !!. 
When !! and !! are continuously differentiable then !!!!!!! and !!!!!!! exists (i.e. (38) exists).   
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The first derivative of the line integral with respect to !! is equal to the price for that period: 
 !!!! !! !!!, !!! !!!!!!!!!!,!!!,! = !!  
 
4.3.1 The model 
Pressman (1970) analyse the general model:  
 max!!,! !!!!! !!! , !!! !!!′!!!! −!!,!!!,! !"! 
subject to ! = !! !!, !! !!!!!! − !" ≤ ! !! ≤ ! !! = !! !!  !! ! > !! !  !! ,! > 0 !,!!!"#$%, ! = 1,2 
(39) 
 
He considers the constraint ! ≤ ! instead of the breakeven constraint ! ≥ 0, where ! is the 
maximum allowed profit for the firm. As far as I know, when a social planner maximizes 
welfare, ! ≥ 0  is the relevant constraint on profit and normally denoted a breakeven 
constraint. However, when the monopoly maximizes profit (see next chapter) ! ≤ ! is the 
relevant profit constraint, and normally denoted a regulatory constraint. Both the breakeven 
constraint and the regulatory constraints are subcases of profit constraints, where the first is 
related to a social planner maximizing welfare and the second to a profit-maximizing firm. 
Since Pressman considers a social planner that maximizes welfare the relevant profit 
constraint would be the breakeven constraint ! ≥ 0 and not the regulatory constraint ! ≤ !.  
The maximization problem with !" = !!!!!!! + !" is restated as: 
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 max!!,! !!!!! !!! , !!! !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!! − !"!!,!!!,!  
subject to ! = !! !!, !! !!!!!! − !!!!!!! − !"! ≥ 0 !! ≤ ! !! = !! !!  !! ! > !! !  !! ,! > 0 !,!!!"#$%, ! = 1,2 
(40) 
 
The Lagrangian for the problem is:  !(!! ,!) = !!!!! !!! , !!! !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!! − !"!!,!!!,! )− !!(!! −!!!! !)+ ! !! !!, !! !!!!!! − !!!!!!! − !" !! 
 
Endogenous variables are !!, !, !! and ! (! = 1,2). The necessary first-order conditions are: 
 !"!!! = !! − ! − !! − ! ! − !!!!!! !! −!!!! !! = 0!! (41) 
  !"!" = −! + !!!!!! − !" = 0! (42) 
  !! ≥ 0, = 0!!"#!!! < ! ! (43) 
  ! ≥ 0, = 0!!"#!! > 0 !!! (44) 
 
The optimum sized plant is derived form equation (42) and is similar to (31) ignoring the 
linearity of costs. The expression for optimal short-run price (41) could be rewritten as (see 
appendix B2):  
 !! = ! + !!1+ !1− !1+ ! 1!! + 1!!" ! , ! ≠ !!! (45) 
Where !!" = − !!!!!! !!!! , ! ≠ ! is the percentage change in demand for good ! that occurs in a 
response to a percentage change in the price of the other god !, i.e. the cross-elasticity. The 
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cross-elasticity is zero when demand is independent. Specifically, when !! = ! and !! < ! 
equation (45) gives: 
 !! = ! + !!1+ !1− ! 1!! + 1!!" , !! = !1− ! 1!! + 1!!"  (46) 
 
Where the Ramsey number ! =  !!!! , ! ∈ 0,1 . The short-run prices given optimized 
capacity, i.e. when !! = (1+ !)!!, is: 
 !! = ! + !1− ! 1!! + 1!!" , !! = !1− ! 1!! + 1!!"  (47) 
 
 
4.3.2 Implication for the Steiner result 
The Steiner result 1 is further extended to set prices in accordance also with the cross-price 
elasticity of demand, assumed the breakeven constraint is active. See section 4.3.2 for 
implication of result 2 when elasticity if demand is included in the analysis.   
 
Whether it is necessary and reasonable to relax the assumption about independent demand is, 
of course, an empirical question. In circumstances where time patterns of consumption are 
relative inflexible, the independence assumption is presumably a close approximation. 
Additionally, including the dependence demand assumption transforms the partial 
equilibrium model of Steiner to a more general equilibrium model. We speak of a price 
change having impact one more than one market, when a price change in one period affects 
demand in the other period. The Steiner model clearly separate the market in period 1 and 2 
and interdependencies may lie outside the scope of this paper because a more general model 
replaces the partial equilibrium model.  
 
 
4.4 The profit-maximizing monopoly  
The literature on peak load pricing essentially emerged in response to problems faced by 
most public utilities such as electricity supply industry, whose context lead the economists 
like Steiner to model pricing rules based on maximization of social welfare rather than 
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profits. Boiteux (1971, p. 219) points out that the objective of maximizing social welfare calls 
for the monopolies to operate as though they were maximizing profits at constant prices. In 
the case of monopolies this requires substitution of their natural behaviour of equating 
marginal revenue to marginal cost, by the marginal cost pricing principle. However, the 
welfare-maximizing marginal-cost pricing rule may be inapplicable. Bailey (1972, p. 662) 
argues that the peak-load pricing model is (for the 1970s) most applicable to regulated 
monopolies, and therefore develops a peak-load pricing model concerned with the regulated 
profit-maximizing monopoly 9 . The profit maximizing monopoly without regulation is 
reviewed in Section 4.4.1 and with regulation in Section 4.4.2. Williamson (1974) are the 
inspiration for section 4.4.1. Bailey (1972) and Bailey and White (1974) are the inspiration 
for section 4.4.2. Section 4.4.3 analyse the implication for the Steiner result.  
 
4.4.1 The unregulated profit-maximizing monopoly 
 max!!,! !!(!!)!!!!!! − !!!!!!! − !"  
subject to !! ≤ ! !! = !! !!  !! ! > !! !  !! ,! > 0 !,!!!"#$%, ! = 1,2 
(48) 
The Lagrangian for the problem:  ! !! ,! = ! !!(!!)!!!!!! − !!!!!!! − !!" − !!(!! −!!!! !)!! 
 
Endogenous variables are !!, ! and !!  (! = 1,2). The necessary first-order conditions are: 
 !" !! ,!!!! = !! !! + !!! !!!!! !! − ! − !! = 0!!! (49) 
  !" !! ,!!" = −! + !!!!!! = 0! (50) 
  !! ≥ 0, = 0!!"#!!! < ! !!! (51) 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 See Gerstner (1986) for a peak-load pricing model where the profit-maximizing firm 
operate in competitive markets.  
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The short-run pricing rule, equation (49), illustrates the natural behaviour of a monopoly of 
equating marginal revenue (!" = !! !! + !!! !!!!! !!) to marginal short run cost (! + !!). 
Equation (49) could be rewritten as: 
 !! = ! + !!1− 1!! ! (52) 
 
Pricing according to (52) is called Ramsey pricing, where prices additionally to short-run 
marginal costs also depends on demand elasticities.  The profit-maximizing firm take 
advantage of especially inelastic demand; the more inelastic demand (i.e. the smaller !!) the 
larger the price. To ensure positive prices we assume !! > 1. Except when !! = ∞ the profit-
maximizing solution deviates from the welfare maximizing solution (10), which is the reason 
for the regulatory constrains.  
 
When !! = ! and !! < ! optimum capacity is found where !! = !. Optimum prices when 
capacity is optimized is: 
 !! = ! + !1− 1!! , !! = !1− 1!! (53) 
 
Crew et al (1995, p. 219) and Bailey (1972, p. 674) points out that the Ramsey number 
denoted ! = !!!!  provides a useful link between the welfare maximizing social planner 
subject to a breakeven constraint and the unregulated profit maximizing monopoly. The 
optimum prices for a breakeven social planner when capacity is optimized and linear costs: 
 !! = ! + !1− ! 1!! , !! = !1− ! 1!!  (54) 
When ! = 1 (i.e.!! = ∞) the solutions are identical.  
 
 
4.4.2 The regulated profit-maximizing monopoly 
Bailey (1972, p. 666) considers a regulatory limit, which holds profit at or below some level !!(!!, !!,!). The regulatory limit will increase as the size of the system is increased, i.e. !"!!! , !"!" > 0.!Assume that the monopolist is not allowed to include “useless” capacity in its 
!40!
rate base, but must actually put the investment to work in the form of operating capacity. This 
is a second-best solution for the monopoly as a revenue requirement is forced upon them.  
 Max!!,! !!(!!)!!!!!! − !!!!!!! − !" ! 
subject to ! = !!(!!)!!!!!! − !!!!!!! − !!" ≤ ! !!, !!,!  !! ≤ ! !! = !! !!  !! ! > !! !  !! ,! > 0 !,!!!"#$%, ! = 1,2 
(55) 
The Lagrangian for the problem is: ! !! ,! = ! !!(!!)!!!!!! − !!!!!!! − !!" − !!(!! −!!!! !)− ! !!(!!)!!!!!! − !!!!!!! − !!" − ! !!, !!,!  
 
Endogenous variables are !!, !, !! and ! (! = 1,2). The necessary first-order conditions are: 
 !" !! ,!!!! = !! !! + !!! !!!!! !! − ! − !!− ! !! !! + !!! !!!!! !! − ! − !"!!! = 0!!! (56) 
  !" !! ,!!" = −! + !!!!!! + ! ! + !"!" = 0 (57) 
  !! ≥ 0, = 0!!"#!!! < !  (58) 
  ! ≥ 0, = 0!!"#!! < !  (59) 
 
Where ! is the shadow price on the profit ceiling ! and is the change in the optimized 
objective of profit of relaxing the profit ceiling with one unit. The shadow price on the profit 
ceiling and may be interpreted as the monopolies marginal willingness to pay for relaxing the 
profit ceiling by one unit.  The monopolies are not willing to pay more for relaxing the profit 
ceiling than the actual increase in profit ceiling, which would imply a marginal reduction in 
profit. That is ! lies between zero and one.  
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The short-run pricing rule, equation (49) could be rewritten as: 
 !! = ! + !!1− ! − !1− ! !"!!!1− 1!! ! , !! ≠ 1, ! ≠ 1 (60) 
 
Specifically, when !! = ! and !! < ! the short-run solution is: 
 !! = ! + !!1− ! − !1− ! !"!!!1− 1!! , !! =
! − !1− ! !"!!!1− 1!!  (61) 
 
The prices are reduced relative to the unregulated case (52). The short-run solution when 
capacity is optimal chosen, i.e. when !! = !!(1− !)!– ! !"!", is: 
 !! = ! + ! − !1− ! !"!!! + !"!"1− 1!! , !! =
! − !1− ! !"!!!1− 1!! ! (62) 
 
Regulation is effective in that, relative to the unregulated case, the monopoly profits and 
prices are reduced and capacity is increased. According to (62) peak prices is reduced more 
than off-peak price due to !"!". Because constrained profits increase with the level of capacity, 
the firm passes on the benefits of regulation to those users whose increased demand will 
cause an increase in capacity (i.e. the peak-users) relative to the unregulated profit-
maximizing monopoly. (Whether the level of capacity expands between the beyond the 
welfare-maximizing level depend on the parameters of the system, nothing general can be 
said.) 
 
The method of regulation can have substantial effects on the distribution of price reductions 
between peak-and off-peak users. Bailey (1972) considers three particular forms for the profit 
ceiling !. The first is the rate of return-on-investment10 constraint where the firm’s earnings 
may not exceed a fixed amount ! for each unit of its capacity, assumed ! > !. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 See Crew and Kleindorfer (1981) for the effects of rate-of-return regulation under a diverse 
technology for a profit-maximizing monopolist.  
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 ! = ! − ! !! (63) 
The second method of regulation limits the firm’s profits to a fixed amount ! per unit of 
output.  
 ! = ! !!!!!!  (64) 
The third method of constraint involves permitting the firm a fair return on total costs, ! >0.  
 ! = ! !!!!!!! + !" ! (65) 
 
The solutions for the specific cases are: 
 
Table 2: Particular forms for the profit ceiling 
 Peak price, !! Off-peak price, !! 
Rate-of return regulation (63) ! + ! − !1− ! ! − !1− 1!!  
!1− 1!! 
Regulation limiting profit per unit (64) ! + ! − !1− ! !1− 1!!  
! − !1− ! !1− 1!!  
Return on cost regulation (65) ! + ! 1−! !1− !1− 1!!  
! 1−! !1− !1− 1!!  
 
 
4.4.3 Implication for the Steiner results 
The Steiner result 1 must be further extended to include elasticity of demand when profit 
maximization is the objective. (Notice that this does not assume binding breakeven constraint 
a is the case for the breakeven welfare-maximization model.) Additionally, when the 
monopoly is subject to regulation prices additionally depend on the change in the profit 
ceiling of a marginal change in produces output !"!!!, and the shadow price on the profit 
ceiling !.  
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Result 2 may be altered when profit maximizing is the objective because prices depend on 
elasticity resulting in a possible pricing reversal. For all the specific cases of the profit ceiling !, whether peak price is larger than off peak price or the other way around depends on the 
relative size of !,!, the price elasticity’s, and the specific parameters !,! and !.  
 
Pricing reversal is most likely to happen for rate of return regulation. Rate of return 
regulation is asymmetric in its effects because the entire effect of the regulation is reflected in 
the peak price. Rate of return regulation gives an incentive to lower the rate to the peak users 
while keeping the off-peak rate at the monopoly level. Intuitively, because constrained profits 
increase with the level of capacity, the firm passes on the benefits of regulation to those users 
whose increased demand will cause an increase in capacity. Accordingly, the likelihood is 
increased of finding the pricing reversal. Regulation limiting profits per unit and return on 
cost regulation have symmetric effects on peak- and off-peak prices; both prices are reduces 
compared to the unregulated profit-maximization. The regulation limiting profit per unit is 
symmetric in that whether the operating costs arise in peak-or off-peak period is irrelevant. 
The return on cost regulation is symmetric in that it treats all dollar costs in the same way 
independent of whether they arise from operating or capacity considerations.   
 
Result 4 about optimal capacity is extended when the monopoly is subject to regulation. 
Optimum capacity is found where the marginal willingness to pay for an additional unit of 
capacity over periods equal the marginal cost of expanding capacity minus an interaction 
effect between the capacity cost and the regulatory constraint.  
 
 
4.5 Multiple Technologies 
We now relax the assumption of a single-technology and allow for more than one technology 
with different cost characteristics. Crew and Kleindorfer (1971; 1975; 1976), Wenders 
(1976), Panzar (1976), and Turvey (1968) have studies this case. Section 4.5.1 reviews the 
optimal plant mix. Section 4.5.2 reviews the optimal prices. Both sections are mainly based 
on Crew and Kleindorfer (1971) and Crew et al (1995, pp. 221-225) who summarize their 
results. Section 4.5.3 describe the implications of allowing for multiple technologies on the 
Steiner results.  
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4.5.1 Optimal technology mix 
Assume two plants available for meeting the demands. Plant 1 and plant 2 have constant 
operating costs of !! and !! per unit per period, and capacity costs of !! and !! per unit of 
capacity, respectively. Assume that the technologies have been numbered such that the 
following condition hold:  
 !! < !!, !! > !! (66) !
If such a numbering were not the case, say, !! > !!,!! > !! , then plant 1 would be 
dominated by plant 2. For both technologies to be used in the optimal solution the following 
must hold:!
 !! − !!2 < !! − !! < !! − !! (67) 
If the left-hand (respectively, right-hand) inequality is violated, only technology 2 
(respectively, technology 1) need be used in any optimal solution. Using the numbering (66), 
the efficient technology frontier is downward sloping and convex in (!,!) space as shown in 
figure 7 for four types of technology. 
 
Figure 7: Efficient frontier. Source: Crew and Kleindorfer (1975, p. 84) 
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Notice, that plant type (!,!) would be ruled out in this case as its addition to the existing 
plant mix would violate the required convexity of the technological frontier. Some 
combination of technologies at the efficient frontier, would dominate any technology (!,!).  
 
When having multiple technologies with different cost characteristics according to (66) and 
(67) it is economical to employ technology 1 with high capacity (i.e. construction) costs and 
low operating costs as base load technology, and use technology 2 with low capacity costs 
and high operating costs as peaking technology. That is technology 1 is continuously 
operated over the cycle, while technology 2 is used as a top-up in the peak period. This 
technology mix would offer cost advantages in meeting a peak demand of short duration. 
Therefore, capacity is installed in order of decreasing capacity costs, and once capacity is 
installed it should be operated in order of increasing operating costs (i.e. merit order).  
 
4.5.2 Optimal pricing 
Let !! ≥ 0 be the constant operating cost per unit of !! per period supplied from plant ! =1,2. Let the quantity supplied from plant ! = 1,2 in period ! = 1,2 be denoted by !!!, and the 
capacity of plant ! = 1,2 be denoted by !! . The systems capacity is ! = !!!!!! . The 
problem to be maximized could be stated as11: 
 max!!,! !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! − !!!!!!!!!! !!! − !!!!!! !!  
subject to !!! + !!! = !! !!" ≤ !! !! = !! !!  !! ! > !! !  !! ,!! > 0 !,!!!"#$%, ! = 1,2, ! = 1,2 
(68) 
The Lagrangian for the problem is: 
!(!!" ,!!) = !! !! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! − !!!!!!!!!! !!" − !!!!!! !! − !!" !!" − !!!!!!!!!! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See Crew and Kleindorfer (1971, pp. 1375-1376) for a profit-maximizing monopoly with 
diverse technology.  
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Endogenous variables are !!" , !!  and !!  ( ! = 1,2, ! = 1,2 ). The necessary first-order 
conditions are: 
 !"!!!" = !! − !! − !!" ≤ 0 = 0!!"#!!!" > 0 !!!!!!!! (69) 
  !"!!! = −!! + !!"!!!! = 0! (70) 
  !!" ≥ 0! = 0!!"#!!!" < !! ! !! (71) 
 
The Lagrangian parameter !!" is the shadow price of a marginal increase in !!, and can be 
interpreted as the willingness to pay for an additional unit of capacity of technology ! by 
customer’s in period !. The general pricing rule for given capacity is given by equation (69), 
and the general optimal capacity rule is given by (70).  
 
Specifically, when !! = ! and !! < ! we have: 
• In period 1 both plants are used at its maximum capacity.  
 !!! = !!, !!" = !! (72) 
• In period 2 plants are used in merit order that is plant 1 will be used first. Assume 
plant 1 is used at its maximum capacity, while plant 2 is unused.  
 !!" = !!, !!! = 0 (73) 
 
From (71) we obtain the shadow prices for the capacity constraint: 
 !!! > 0, !!" > 0, !!" > 0, !!! = 0!! (74) 
According to (70) optimal capacity for technology 1 is found where the marginal willingness 
to pay for technology 1 of both peak-and off-peak customer’s is equal to the actual cost of 
installing one additional unit capacity unit of technology 1: 
 !! = !!! + !!" (75) 
Optimal capacity for technology 2 is found where the marginal willingness to pay for 
technology 2 of peak customer’s is equal to the actual cost of installing one additional unit 
capacity unit of technology 2: 
 !! = !!" (76) 
Studying (69) for the different combinations of ! = 1,2 and ! = 1,2 gives the following prices 
when capacity is optimized: 
! 47!
 !! = !! + !!!,!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! = !! + 2!! − !! + !! !! (77) 
 
4.5.3 Implication for the Steiner result 
Result 1 may be valid with multiple technologies because some sort of marginal cost pricing 
is still relevant. Optimal peak price is equal to the marginal cost of expansion of the peak 
quantity, whereas optimal off-peak price is set equal to the marginal cost of expansion of the 
off-peak quantity (assumed that peak demand is also expanded in the same proportion).  Price 
is set equal to the marginal cost of expanding the demand in that period. 
 
Result 4 has to be extended in the diverse technology case because the capacity decision has 
to be understood in a broader integrated resource-planning context. Plants are to be installed 
and operated in order of increasing operating costs and decreasing capacity costs. Optimal 
capacity of a type of technology is found where the sum of the marginal willingness to pay 
for an additional unit of capacity over the periods is equal to the actual cost of increasing that 
capacity by one unit.  
 
Result 3 is no longer valid when multiple technologies are considered. Off-peak users are 
made to contribute to capacity costs related to the base load capacity, !!, because base load 
capacity is continuously operated and used by all consumers both in peak and off-peak 
periods. Plants are required to meet not only peak demand but also base demand, thus the 
additional capacity costs involving installing new base load plants must be born by all the 
consumers. This implies that off-peak customers also press against some capacity, and hence 
corresponding capacity costs are allocated to the off-peak consumers. 
 
Weintraub (1970) argues that the Steiner one-technology solution is unacceptable on welfare 
grounds because of the so-called “free rider” problem. Off-peak consumers pay no capacity 
costs but are supplied output out of capacity. Crew and Kleindorfer (1975, p. 88) explain that 
the income distribution objections may be overcome by a more complex technology. The 
pricing rule with multiple technologies differs from the Steiner solution in that off-peak users 
are made to pay a fraction of the capacity costs in proportion to its relative total utilization, 
thus having favourable income distribution effects for the peak users.  
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4.6 Unequal length of periods 
Williamson (1966; 1974) allow for unequal length of periods. Let !!and !! be the fraction 
of a cycle accounted for by the peak period and off-peak period (!! + !! = 1). The 
maximization problem with unequal length of periods, i.e. !! ≠ !!: 
 max!!,! !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! !! − !!!!!!! !! − !" !!! 
subject to !! ≤ ! !! = !! !!  !! ! > !! !  !! ,! > 0 !,!,!! !!"#$%, ! = 1,2 
 
The Lagrangian to the problem is: 
 ! !! ,! = !!!!! !!′ !!!′!!!! !! − !!!!!!! !! − !" − !!!!!! !! − ! !!  
 
Endogenous variables are !!, ! and !! (! = 1,2). The necessary first-order conditions are: 
 !" !! ,!!!! = !!!! − !!! − !! = 0!!!!  
  !" !! ,!!" = −! + !!!!!! = 0!!  
  !! ≥ 0, = 0!!"#!!! < !   
 
The general pricing rule is: 
 !! = ! + !!!! !! (78) 
Specifically, when !! = ! and !! < ! optimal short-run prices are: 
 !! = ! + !!!! ! , !! = ! (79) 
The larger the fraction of a cycle accounted for by the peak load, the lower the peak price 
since capacity can be divided over a larger time-interval. Allowing for unequal length of 
periods does not change the Steiner results.  
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5 Findings 
This paper has studied how robust the general Steiner result for optimal pricing and optimal 
capacity are to changes in the assumptions. 
 
Result 1 of price equal to long run marginal cost is not robust to changes in the assumption of 
linear costs, fully variable capacity in the long run, dependent demand, the objective of 
maximizing welfare and only considering the long run planning point of view. They are all 
crucial assumptions for result 1. Still, prices depend on marginal cost, however not the long-
run marginal cost Steiner advocate but the short-run marginal cost. The demand for 
electricity exhibits substantial variations over periods of time too short to permit capacity to 
be varied so as to keep price continuously equal to long-run marginal cost. At any point in 
time capacity at that time is fixed and the only decision at that time is of pricing optimality 
within the capacity constraint. The Steiner prices are actually prices for a future cycle when 
capacity is optimized.  
 
When considering a breakeven welfare-maximizing social planner or a profit-maximizing 
social planner, prices also depend on elasticity of demand. To ensure the firm at least break 
eve, a breakeven constraint is imposed when non-linear costs or fixed capacity in the long run 
is the case. If the monopoly is regulated the prices is affected by the specific regulation. 
When dependent demand is considered, prices also depend on the cross-elasticity of demand. 
However, the relevance of altering the assumption of independent demand is an empirical 
question. In addition, dependent demand may violate the framework of partial equilibrium 
model and thus be outside the scope of this paper. With multiple technologies some sort of 
marginal cost pricing is still relevant. Price is set equal to the marginal cost of expanding the 
demand in that period.  
 
Result 2 of peak price higher than off-peak price follows automatically in the standard model 
in which there is a welfare objective, the firm has constant returns to scale in production and 
where capacity is fully variable in the long-run view. In general, nothing as strong as result 2 
can be stated when considering a profit-maximizing monopoly or a breakeven welfare-
maximizing social planner (to ensure non-negative profits in the case of constant returns to 
scale or fixed capacity in the long run). Then prices depend on elasticity of demand and the 
pricing reversal phenomenon may occur depending on the parameters. Additionally, when we 
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relax the assumption of independent demand, which may not be that reasonable to study, 
price will also depend on the cross-elasticity of demand and may contribute to pricing 
reversal. The assumptions of welfare-objective, linear costs, capacity fully variable in the 
long run and independent demand are crucial assumptions for result 2. Notice, however if 
they are all relaxed result 2 may still be valid depending on the specific parameters.  
 
Result 3 of no responsibility for capacity cost imputed to those customers whose demand 
does not press upon capacity has been criticized on welfare grounds since off-peak customers 
are also served by the capacity even if they do not press against the capacity. The result is not 
valid for the short-run peak load problem, as capacity cost is only related to the long-run peak 
load problem. The one-technology (i.e. homogenous plant capacity) assumption is crucial for 
the result that peak users bear all of the capacity costs. When diverse technology is 
introduced off-peak customers are made to contribute to capacity costs, since they press 
against the capacity limit to the base-load capacity. 
 
Result 4 of optimal capacity found where it is equal to peak demand when optimized is 
relatively simple, and therefore does survive the different extensions reviewed. However, this 
is strictly speaking not a result of the Steiner model – it is a relationship by definition. For all 
the extensions of the model, optimal capacity is equal to peak load demand due to the 
imputed capacity constraint. However, how to find optimal capacity in the extended models 
is different than Steiner advocates.  
 
When capacity constraint is considered the analysis of optimal investment is extended due to 
the dual variable followed by the capacity constraints. Optimal capacity is obtained where the 
sum of marginal willingness to pay over the periods for one additional over unit of capacity 
equals the actual cost of one additional unit of capacity. For the breakeven welfare-
maximizing social planner and the unregulated profit-maximizing monopoly, the sum of 
marginal willingness to pay over the periods for one additional unit of capacity equals the 
actual cost of one additional unit of capacity and the shadow price on the breakeven 
constraint. This implies reduced optimum size of capacity compared to the pure welfare-
maximizing capacity. For the regulated profit-maximizing monopoly the sum of marginal 
willingness to pay over the periods for one additional over unit of capacity equals the actual 
cost of one additional unit of capacity and an interaction effect between the capacity cost and 
the regulatory constraint, implying that optimal capacity is larger than the unregulated profit-
! 51!
maximizing monopoly (whether is it larger than the welfare-maximizing capacity level 
depends on the parameters). For multiple technologies the capacity decision has to be 
understood in a broader integrated resource-planning context. Plants are to be installed and 
operated in order of increasing operating costs and decreasing capacity costs. Optimal 
capacity of a type of technology is found where the sum of the marginal willingness to pay 
for an additional unit of capacity over the periods is equal to the actual cost of increasing that 
capacity by one unit. The Steiner result 4 is strictly speaking not altered when the 
assumptions is relaxed, and is robust. However, when the above assumptions are relaxed the 
valuable new information is obtained.  
 
The robust result of Steiner’s peak-load pricing when relaxing the above-mentioned 
assumptions is to set one price in each pricing period in accordance with the pattern of 
demand and prices are closely tied to variation in the marginal cost of generating electricity. 
Optimal capacity is equal to peak demand.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!52!
6 References  
 
Abrate, G. (2004): “Peak-Load Pricing in the Electricity Market: Theory and Practice”, 
Public Economics Italian Society (SIEP), Working Paper No. 327, http://www-
3.unipv.it/websiep/wp/327.pdf, accessed 30/04-2014. 
 
Andersson, R. and M. Bohman (1985): Short- and long-run marginal cost pricing – On their 
alleged equivalence, Energy Economics, 7 (4), 279-288. 
 
Arellano, M. S. and P. Serra (2007): Spatial Peak-Load Pricing, Energy Economics, 29 (2), 
228-239.  
 
Asbury, J. G. and R. O. Mueller (1978): The Peak Load problem with Storage Technology, 
Resources and Energy, 1 (4), 325-337.  
 
Ault, R. W. and R. B. Ekelund (1987): The Problem of Unnecessary Originality in 
Economics, Southern Economic Journal, 53 (3), 651-661. 
 
Bailey, E. E. (1972): Peak-Load Pricing under Regulatory Constraint, Journal of Political 
Economy, 80 (4), 662-679. 
 
Bailey, E. E. and L. J. White (1974): Reversals in Peak and Offpeak Prices, The Bell Journal 
of Economics and Management Science, 5 (1), 75-92. 
 
Baumol, W. J. and D. F. Bradford (1970): Optimal Departures From Marginal Cost Pricing, 
The American Economic Review, 60 (3), 265-283.  
 
Bergstrom, T. and J. K. MacKie-Mason (1991): Some Simple Analytics of Peak-Load 
Pricing, RAND Journal of Economics, 22 (2), 241-249. 
 
Boiteux, M. (1960): Peak-Load Pricing, The Journal of Business, 33 (2), 157-179. 
 
! 53!
Boiteux, M. (1971): On the Management of Public Monopolies Subject to Budgetary 
Constraints, Journal of Economic Theory, 3 (3), 219-240.  
 
Buchanan, J. M. (1966): Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing – Comment, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 80 (3), 463-471.  
 
Bye, R. T. (1929): Composite Demand and Joint supply in Relation to public Utility Rates, 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 44 (1), 40-62.  
 
Crew, M. A. and P. R. Kleindorfer (1971): Marshall and Turvey on Peak Load or Joint 
Product Pricing, Journal of Political Economy, 79 (6), 1369-1377. 
 
Crew, M. A. and P. R. Kleindorfer (1975): On Off-Peak Pricing: An Alternative 
Technological Solution, Kyklos, 28 (1), 80-93. 
 
Crew, M. A. and P. R. Kleindorfer (1976): Peak Load Pricing with a Diverse Technology, 
The Bell Journal of Economics, 7 (1), 207-231. 
 
Crew, M. A. and P. R. Kleindorfer (1981): Regulation and Diverse Technology in the Peak 
Load Problem, Southern Economic Journal, 48 (2), 335-343. 
 
Crew, M. A., C. S. Fernando and P. R. Kleindorfer (1995): The Theory of Peak-Load Pricing: 
A Survey (1995), Journal of Regulatory Economics, 8 (3), 215-248. 
 
Dansby, R. E. (1978): Capacity Constrained Peak Load Pricing, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 92 (3), 387-398. 
 
Gabor, A. (1966): Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing – Further Comment, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 80 (3), 472-480.  
 
Gallant A. R. and R. W. Koenker (1984): Costs and Benefits of Peak-Load Pricing of 
Electricity – A Continuous-Time Econometric Approach, Journal of Econometrics, 26 (1-2), 
83-113. 
 
!54!
Gerstner, E. (1986): Peak Load Pricing in Competitive Markets, Economic Inquiry, 24 (2), 
349-361. 
 
Gibbard, A. and H. R. Varian (1978): Economic-Models, Journal of Philosophy, 75 (11), 
664-677.  
 
Gravelle, H. S. E. (1976): The Peak Load Problem with Feasible Storage,  The Economic 
Journal,  86 (324), 256-277.  
 
Hirshleifer, J. (1958): Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing: Comment, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 72 (3), 451-462.  
 
Houthakker, H. S. (1951): Electricity Tariffs in Theory and Practice, The Economic Journal, 
61 (241), 1-25.  
 
Joskow, P. L. and C. D. Wolfram (2012): Dynamic Pricing of Electricity, American 
Economic Review, 102 (3), 381-385.  
 
Kjølle, G. (2009): “The Cost of Energy Not Supplied arrangement (CENS)”, SINTEF Energy 
Research, http://www.sintef.no/project/KILE_UK/The%20cost%20of%20energy%20not  
%20supplied%20arrangement.pdf, accessed 13/04-2014. 
 
Kjølle, G., K. Samdal and O. Mogstad (2007): “Trends in quality of supply in a liberalized 
electricity market”, CIRED, Vienna, 
http://www.sintef.no/project/KILE/Publikasjoner/CIRED-2007_paper_0801.pdf, accessed 
13/04-2014. 
 
Kleindorfer, P. R. and C. S. Fernando (1993): Peak-Load Pricing and Reliability Under 
Uncertainty, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 5 (1), 5-23. 
 
Lewis, W. A. (1941a): The Two-Part Tariff, Economica-New Series, 8 (31), 249-270. 
 
Lewis, W. A. (1941b): The Two-Part Tariff: A Reply, Economica-New Series, 8 (32),  
399-408. 
! 55!
 
Lioukas, S. K. (1983): Peak Load Pricing Under Periodic and Stochastic Supply, European 
Economic Review, 20 (1-3), 13-21. 
 
Littlechild, S. C. (1970): Marginal-Cost Pricing with Joint Costs, The Economic Journal, 80 
(318), 323-335. 
 
Mohring, H. (1970): The Peak Load Problem with Increasing Returns and Pricing 
Constraints, The American Economic Review, 60 (4), 693-705. 
 
Nguyen, D. T. (1976): The Problem of Peak Loads and Inventories, Bell journal of 
Economics, 1 (7), 232-241.  
 
NVE (2014): “Smarte strømmålere”, (In Norwegian, “Smart meters”), 
http://www.nve.no/no/Kraftmarked/Sluttbrukermarkedet/AMS/, accessed 9/5-2014.  
 
Panzar, J. S. (1976): A Neoclassical Approach to Peak Load Pricing, The Bell Journal of 
Economics, 7 (2), 521-530.  
 
Pressman, I. (1970): A Mathematical Formulation of the Peak-Load Pricing Problem, The 
Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1 (2), 304-326. 
 
Solow, R. M. (1956): A contribution to the theory of economic growth, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 70 (1), 65-94. 
 
Steiner, P. O. (1957): Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
71 (4), 585-610.  
 
Turvey, R. (1968): Peak-Load Pricing, Journal of Political Economy, 76 (1), 101-113. 
 
Weintraub, S. (1970): On Off-Peak Pricing: An Alternative Solution, Kyklos, 23 (3), 501-
519. 
 
!56!
Wenders, J. T. (1976): Peak Load Pricing in the Electric Utility Industry, The Bell Journal of 
Economics, 7 (1), 232-241. 
 
Williamson, O. E. (1966): Peak-Load Pricing and Optimal Capacity under Indivisibility 
Constraints, The American Economic Review, 56 (4), 810-827.  
 
Williamson, O. E. (1974): Peak-Load Pricing: Some Further Remarks, The Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science, 5 (1), 223-228. 
 
 
! 57!
Appendices 
A    Social Science Citation Index – results  
 
Citation search according to Social Science citation Index yielded the following 
chronological results (30/04-2014).  
Papers Times cited  
Bye (1929) 6 
Lewis (1941a) 18 
Lewis (1941b) 1 
Houthakker (1951) 40 
Steiner (1957) 167 
Hirshleifer (1958) 61 
Boiteux (1960) 101 
Williamson (1966) 163 
Gabor (1966) 2 
Buchanan (1966) 14 
Turvey (1968) 26 
Mohring (1970) 102 
Pressman (1970) 48 
Littlechild (1970) 26 
Weintraub (1970) 3 
Crew and Kleindorfer (1971) 10 
Bailey (1972) 24 
Bailey and White (1974) 26 
Williamson (1974) 0 
Crew and Kleindorfer (1975) 6 
Gravelle (1976) 7 
Crew and Kleindorfer (1976) 67 
Nguyen (1976) 7 
Wenders (1976) 56 
Panzar (1976) 42 
Asbury and Mueller (1978) - 
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Dansby (1978) 5 
Crew and Kleindorfer (1981) 5 
Lioukas (1983) 2 
Gallant and Koenker (1984) 9 
Gerstner (1986) 5 
Bergstrom and MacKie-Mason (1991) 9 
Kleindorfer and Fernando (1993) 24 
Crew et al (1995) 79 
 
 
 
B    Mathematical calculations 
 
B1 
Multiply !!! !!!!! !! with !! !!!! !!  then first order equation (22) is: 
 !! − ! − !! + ! !! !! + !!! !!!!! !!!! !! !! !! − ! = 0!!!  
Since !! = − !!!! !!!!!!, we have: 
 !! − ! − !! + ! !! − !!!! − ! = 0!!!  
Rearranging we get: 
 !! = !! + !(1+ !)1+ ! − ! 1!!   
If multiplied with !!!!!! we obtain equation (25).  
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B2 
Because ! = 1,2 and ! = 1,2 first order equation (41) may be rewritten as: 
 !! − ! − !! + ! !! + !!!!!! !! + !!!!!! !! − ! = 0!!  
Multiply
!!!!!! !! and !!!!!! !! with !!!! then: 
 !! − ! − !! + ! !! + !!!!!! !!!! !! + !!!!!! !!!! !! − ! = 0!!  
Using condition (38) of 
!!!!!! = !!!!!! we have: 
 !! − ! − !! + ! !! + !!!!!! !!!! !! + !!!!!! !!!! !! − ! = 0!!  
Since !! = − !!!! !!!!!! and !!" = − !!!!!! !!!!: 
 !! − ! − !! + ! !! − !!!!" − !!!! − ! = 0!!  
Rearranging we get: 
 !! = !! + !(1+ !)1+ ! − ! 1!! + 1!!"   
If multiplied with !!!!!! we obtain equation (45). 
 
